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The objective of this research was to prove that the implementation of good 
corporate governance will have an effect on the real activities 
manipulation which was done by the management. The implementations of 
good governance used by this research are board of director composition 
and audit committee expertise. This research was conducted in Indonesia 
by using 306 firm years’ observations. The result of this research showed a 
different result from previous researches. This research showed that the 
implementation of good corporate governance in the form of board director 
composition and audit committee expertise do not impact the practice of 
real activities manipulation. Or, in other words some of the good corporate 
governance tool could not mitigate the real activities manipulation in the 
company. 
 
   
1.   Introduction 
Earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting 
in order to make stakeholders have improper 
assumptions about economic performance of 
the company or to influence the result of 
contract which depends on accounting 
numbersreported (Healy &Wahlen, 1999). 
Earnings management practices are not always 
detrimental to company because several 
methods used for certain situations are proven 
to provide benefits and improve performance 
of the company. On the other hand, earnings 
management will negatively impact the 
company when it is implemented on the basis 
of managerial opportunism. If there is a way to 
mitigate this managerial opportunism then the 
earnings management which harms the 
company can be reduced as well. 
(Tangjitprom, 2013). Corporate governance 
mechanism is one of alternative ways to 
reduce earnings management practices as it 
provides transparent structures to avoid 
earnings management and improve market. 
(Ajina et al, 2013). 
This research highlights the theme of 
corporate governance and its impact on real 
earnings management level in Southeast Asia. 
The corporate governance mechanism used in 
this research was the corporate governance 
structure in the form of board of director and 
audit committee. More specifically, this 
research focuses on board of director 
composition and audit committee expertise in 
corporate governance mechanisms as they 
have vital roles in mitigating earnings 
management. 
Previous studies on the composition of 
independent commissioners in the board of 
directors showed that it potentially reduce 
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earnings management level. For instance, 
research conducted by Lai and Tam (2007) 
found that the independence of the board of 
directors in Chinese companies could reduce 
the tendency of managers to do earnings 
smoothing. In line with it, research conducted 
by Ajina, Bouchareb and Souid (2013) 
revealed the same result that the independence 
of the board of directors has negative 
implications on earnings management. In a 
nutshell, the more independent the board of 
directors, the more level of earnings 
management will decrease. In contrast with the 
two previous studies, research conducted by 
Gulzar (2011) showed different result that the 
independence of the board of directors do not 
have any significant effect on earnings 
management. In agreement with it, research 
conducted by Chalevas and Tzovas (2010) also 
found that corporate governance mechanisms 
in general do not have any effect on earnings 
manipulation. 
In relation to it, previous studies on the 
audit committee indicated that the 
independence of audit committees may 
improve the quality of financial reports 
(Valminck&Sarens, 2013). In addition to Lin, 
Hutchinson, and Percy (2013) also found that 
the quality and independence of audit 
committees decrease the level of abnormal 
accruals or the measurement of earnings 
management. Other studies showed that audit 
committee expertise results in better internal 
control (Krishnan, 2005) and markets also 
react more positively to companies with more 
qualified audit committees in accounting 
(Defond, Han, & Hu, 2005). In other words, 
the expertise of audit committee in finance 
create better internal control resulting in higher 
quality of financial reports. This is consistent 
with research done by Bedard, Chtourou, and 
Courteau (2004) which revealed that 
educational background or experience in 
finance owned by the audit committee 
negatively affect the practice of earnings 
management because by having 
comprehension on accounting/finance, the 
audit committee can directly oversee the 
process of preparing financial reports 
transparently and produce high quality 
financial reports. The better financial reports, 
the lower earnings management level. 
This study focuses on the influence of the 
board of director composition and the 
expertise of audit committees on real earnings 
management level. It is expected that the 
higher the proportion of independent 
commissioners in the board of directors and 
the higher the level of expertise of the audit 
committee will mitigate the level of real 
earnings management. Real earnings 
management was selected as a dependent 
variable because previous studies on earnings 
management used more abnormal accruals 
than real activities manipulation. The selected 
samples were manufacturing companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). 
Indonesia has an emerging economy, 
especially in terms of its capital markets. 
However, earnings management is still a 
problematic issue facing investors. The 
protection of investor in Indonesia or other 
countries in Southeast Asia has not been ideal 
enough, especially for minority investors. 
Even in advanced countries which have good 
capital market rules and financial report 
regulation, the cases of fraud involving 
earnings management practices still occur. 
Moreover, in Indonesia, a developing country 
withmoderately inadequate rules and 
regulations of capital markets. For instance, 
several cases involving companies which 
proved to inflame the profit to attract funds 
from investors include PT Kimia FarmaTbk, 
PT Indofarma, PT Lippo and some other 
companies alleged to have implemented the 
practice of earnings management in Indonesia. 
This research describes that the possibility by 
improving the effectiveness of corporate 
governance system, the internal control of 
company in generating good financial reports 
will be better so that investors will be more 
protected from harmful earning management 
practices. 
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
2.1 Agency Theory 
In this research, agency theory proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is used. 
Tricker (2009) states that agency theory views 
corporate governance practices through agency 
dilemma perspective. The theory considers 
that corporate governance relations as 
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contracts between principals (shareholders) 
and agents (managers or directors). The most 
common agency problem is about information 
asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent. Directors or managers are believed to 
understand every single thing happens in the 
company while the shareholders must rely on 
the information provided by the directors. The 
information provided is in the form of 
financial reports. Managers who are 
opportunistic or utility maximize in nature 
tend to manipulate financial reports to obtain 
different result which is inadequate to the real 
condition. 
One of solutions for reducing the 
manipulated practicesis a good monitoring 
system from the principal. Corporate 
governance mechanism is considered as one of 
ideal monitoring systems to mitigate the 
opportunistic nature of managers. Baysinger 
and Hoskisson (1990) argue that under agency 
theory, corporate governance mechanisms 
through the board of directors will have the 
legal authority to hire, dismiss and compensate 
management and play an important role in 
safeguarding capital investment. Therefore, 
governance mechanismis an essential element 
in good corporate governance. 
 
2.2 The Effect of Board of Director 
Composition on Real Earnings 
Management 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that board of 
directors has a role as the top control 
mechanism to do the monitoring towards top 
management. The members of board of 
directors from outside of the company are 
supposed to be more independent because they 
do not have any relationship with the top 
management so that they will do their 
monitoring job with more objectivity than the 
others. Independent members of board of 
directors are expected to help mitigating the 
fraud practice by the management. 
Previous studies have examined the 
relationship between the composition of board 
of commissioners and fraudulent practices that 
harm the company, such as negative or 
aggressive profit management. For example,a 
research conducted by Beasley in 1996found 
that the more involvement of independent 
members in the board of commissioners, the 
lower level of fraud in the financial reports. In 
addition, a study done by Gulzar in 2011 also 
revealed that the composition of the board of 
commissioners negatively affects the accrual 
based earnings management. Generally, the 
whole corporate governance mechanism is 
negatively related to the level of earnings 
management in Chinese companies. 
This indicates that through strengthening 
the corporate governance system, investors 
will be better protected from negative earnings 
management practices. Based on the 
description and different result of previous 
research above, the hypothesis of this research 
can be formulated as follow: 
H1: Board of director composition negatively 
affects real earnings management  
 
2.3 The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise on 
Real Earnings Management  
Although research conducted by Beasley's 
in 1996 showed that audit committees do not 
significantly influence trends for managers to 
commit fraud in financial reporting, 
subsequent studies reveal different result. A 
study done by Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau 
in 2004 found that there is a negative 
relationship between financial expertise and 
audit committee governance to aggressive 
earnings management. Krishnan's research in 
2005 provided evidence that independent audit 
committees with fewer skills are involved in 
internal control issues. Good internal controls 
will result in better quality of financial reports, 
better financial reports quality also indicate 
better earnings quality. 
Yang and Krishnan's research (2005) also 
proved that there is a negative relationship 
between the independence of the audit 
committee and the audit committee tenure to 
quarterly earnings management. This further 
strengthens the evidence that a skilled audit 
committee will result in better corporate 
governance mechanisms. Better corporate 
governance mechanisms will produce quality 
of financial reports, especially better quality 
profits. In other words, it will result lower 
levels of earnings management than 
companies with poor governance mechanisms. 
Based on the descriptions, the hypothesis is: 
H2: Audit committee expertise negatively 
affects real earnings management. 
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3.  Research Method 
3.1 Data and Sample 
Data of this research were obtained from 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id). 
The data were in the form of annual report of 
publicly listed companies in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange from 2014-2016. The sampling 
technique was used purposive sampling. The 
criteria of the sample namely: 
1. Manufacturing companies which are 
listed in IDX from 2016-2018. 




3. The company has to use rupiah as the 
reporting currency. 
 
3.2 Variables Definitions and Measurements 
Dependent variable of this research is real 
earnings management. Roychowdury (2006) 
and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) stated that a 
few measurements for real earnings 
management, namely abnormal cash flow from 
operation. Abnormal cash flow from 
operationis calculated from actual cash flow 
from operation minus “normal cash flow” 
which calculated in this formula: 
CFOit /Ait-1 = α0 (1 /Ait-1) + α1 (St /At-1) + α2 
(ΔSt /TAt-1) + εt                          (1) 
At is total asset in the end of period t and St is 
sales in period t, ΔStis the sales in this year (St) 
minus the sales from last year (St-1). Cohen et 
al (2008) also formulated the step to calculate 
normal production cost: 
PRODt/At-1= α0(1/TAit-1) + α1(St/Ait-1) + 
α2(ΔSt/Ait- 1) + α 3(ΔSt-1/Ait-1) + εt            (2) 
PROD is total cost of goods sold minus the 
increase in inventory. 
By simplifying a few of assumptions from 
Dechow et al., (1998) that discretionary 
expenses are supposed to be estimated with a 
linear equation from contemporaneous sales 
and to solve the problem if managers increase 
sales on purpose to increase the reported 
income so discretionary expensesis measured 
by the sales from last period/year. Cohen et al., 
(2008) stated that the formula to estimate 
normal discretionary expensesis: 
DISEXPt/At-1= α0(1/At-1) + α 1(St-1/At-1) + εt (3) 
Based on Cohen et al., (2008), this 
research used a comprehensive set of 
measurement of real earnings management by 
combining the three individual measurements 
which was called REM_Index. REM_Index is 
a standardized total from individual 
component of real earnings management. The 
formula for REM_Index is minus standardized 
Abn_CFO + standardized Abn_Prod – 
standardized Abn_Discexp. 
Boards Structure (IND) was measured by 
a ratio and calculated by dividing the total 
number of independent members of board of 
directors with the total number of members in 
board of directors.  
Audit Committee Expertise (EXPRT) was 
measured by a ratio and calculated by dividing 
the number of audit committee members who 
have degree in accounting or finance with the 
total number of audit committee members. 
 
Control Variable 
Control variables used in this research, 
namely:  
Company Size (Size). Company size is 
measured by using total asset. The formula for 
this measurement is; size = log (total aset book 
value). 
Return on Assets (ROA). Return on Asset 
(ROA) is a ratio shows the return of asset 
which used in a company. This ratio is 
focusing on calculating the efficiency of asset 
usage in order to generate income. The lower 
the ROA, the more motivated the managers to 
manipulate earnings. ROA is formulated:  
 
 
Leverage. Leverageis a risk which can be seen 
from the ratio between total asset and total 
liabilities. The formula to calculate leverage is:  
 
 
3.3 Research Model 
 




REM = Real Earnings Management, which 
consists of three individual measurements such 
as abnormal cash flow from operation, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
abnormal production cost. These three 
individual measurements will be generated 
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into an index which is called RM_Index (-
standardized Abn_CFO+ standardized 
Abn_Prod – standardized Abn_Discexp) 
IND= The total number of independent 
members of board directors divided with total 
members of board directors.  
EXPERT= The total number of audit 
committee members with financial or 
accounting degree divided with total number 
of audit committee members. 
FIRMSIZE= Company Size, which is 
measured by log natural of total asset. 
LEV= Company leverage, which is measured 
by ratio of total liabilities divided by total 
asset. 
ROA= Return on Asset Ratio 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Research Data 
Initial data are 306 firm years. Those data 
were obtained from Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. And those data are tested by using 
the multiple regression analysis. The residuals 
from the was normally distributed which is 
shown by the one sample KS test result in the 
table 1 below. 
 
Tabel 1. Residuals Normality Test  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z Sig. Note 
1,073 0,199 Normally 
Distributed 
 
The independent variables from this 
research also not correlated with each other 
which were shown by the result from the table 
2 below. 
 
Tabel 2. Multicollinearity Test 
Variabel VIF Note 











4.2 Hypothesis Test 
Based on the test results of Glejser test, it 
was found that the significance of each 
variable was less than 0.05. This result implied 
that the research model was experiencing the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. The model was 
also experiencing the autocorrelation problem. 
Therefore, there are limitations in interpreting 
the results of this study. 
Table 3. Hypothesis Test with Multiple 
Regression Analysis 
Variable T count Sig. Note 











The result of multiple regression analysis 
in table 3 above indicated that t count from the 
board of director composition variables was 
lesser than t table, which are -0,358. The t 
count from audit committee expertise variable 
was higher than t table which is 2,588, 
however the positive sign was contradicting 
the hypothesis which said audit committee 
expertise will negatively affect the real 
earnings management. Therefore, H1 and H2 
are not supported.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
This research examines the effect of 
corporate governance and the real earnings 
management practice in Indonesia. Financial 
reporting process is identified as a negotiation 
process between management and auditor 
(Antle&Nelbuff, 1991). This finding is 
consistent with the evidences from financial 
reporting mistakes and auditing adjustments 
through years (e.g., Kinney & Martin, 1994 
and Nelson et al., 2002). Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that good corporate governance 
could mitigate the earnings management 
practice by management. The corporate 
governance practice in this research 
wasproxied by board of director composition 
and audit committee expertise. The earnings 
management practice was proxied by the real 
activities manipulation or real earnings 
management. 
From the hypothesis testing, the result 
showed that the director board composition 
and audit committee expertise do not affect 
real earnings management in Indonesia. The 
result is different from Bradburry, et al., 
(2004) which found that board of directors 
which consist of more independent members 
will deliver more quality in accounting process 
and income. It is shown by the decreasing 
number of earnings management. This result is 
also different from Bedard, et al., (2004) 
which found out that a more expert audit 
committee will mitigate the aggressive 
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earnings management practice by 
management. 
Corporate governance is supposed to 
increase the quality of financial reporting 
because by having good corporate governance 
means that the controlling role will be done 
more effectively. More effective controlling 
role could mitigate the opportunistic earnings 
management practice by the managers. 
Generally, most of the previous research 
indicated that good corporate governance 
system especially in the term of audit 
committee could be a constraint for manager 
to do the earnings management.  
However, the result of this research 
showed that corporate governance system does 
not negatively affect real earnings 
management. It is indicating that good 
corporate governance could not be a constraint 
for manager to do earnings management. This 
result is in accordance with Chi et al., (2011) 
which found that a good quality of auditing as 
a part of corporate governance practice are 
indirectly increasing the real earnings 
management practice. It could happen because 
the manager will strive to find the new way to 
do the earnings management when the 
corporate governance quality is increasing. 
Accrual earnings management is considered 
too risky and is easily discovered, so that 
managers strive to do the real activities 
manipulation which is more difficult to be 
detected.    
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on the result of the test, the first 
hypotheses which stated that the board of 
director composition affects real earnings 
management negatively are not supported. 
Furthermore, the second hypotheses which 
stated that audit committee expertise affects 
real earnings management negatively are also 
not supported. It can be concluded that the 
board of director composition and audit 
committee expertise do not affect the real 
earnings management. The good corporate 
governance practice is supposed to increase 
the quality of accounting process and income 
but it cannot be proved in this research. 
There are some limitations of this research, 
they are: First, this research uses only two 
proxies to measure corporate governance, 
namely: board of director composition and 
audit committee expertise. Second, this 
research is only using three years as research 
period. Third, his research can only be 
conducted in Indonesia because of the 
limitation of database. Finally, most of the 
measurement of control variable are using total 
asset, it could increase the risk of 
heteroscedastisity in this research. Therefore, 
this research suggest for future researcher, it is 
expected to: first, add other proxies of 
corporate governance, such as: ownership 
structure. Second, add more period of time. 
Third, use international accounting context 
with more than one country if the database is 
available. Finally, use different proxies to 
measure the control variable so that the 
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